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Resumen  Abstract 
Procesamiento cognitivo de las leyes de Morgan: Un enfoque de toma 
de decisiones. El objetivo del presente estudio consiste en proponer una 
descripción preliminar del comportamiento espontáneo del pensamiento 
humano en tareas de razonamiento relacionadas con las equivalencias 
lógicas atribuidas a Augustus DeMorgan. Estas equivalencias relacionadas 
con la negación de conjunciones y disyunciones se han estudiado 
previamente sólo en relación con silogismos, pero no desde la toma de 
decisiones. Se realizó un estudio exploratorio on-line para poner a prueba 
dos hipótesis. La primera hipótesis sostiene que la ley de Morgan para 
conjunciones es más fácil de reconocer intuitivamente que la 
correspondiente ley para disyunciones. La segunda afirma que los errores 
en estas tareas son regulados por un patrón cognitivo. La evidencia 
obtenida resultó incompatible con la primera hipótesis y compatible con la 
segunda. Se propuso un heurístico para explicar la inesperada facilidad con 
que los sujetos reconocieron la ley de disyunciones pero no la de 
conjunciones. Se propusieron finalmente lineamientos para futuras 
investigaciones.  
 
 The aim of this contribution is to propose a preliminary account for the 
intuitive recognition of the logical equivalences attributed to Augustus 
DeMorgan. Such equivalences concerned with the negation of conjunctions 
and disjunctions have been previoulsy studied only in the context of 
syllogistic tasks, but not from the perspective of decision making. An on-
line exploratory study was conducted to test two hypotheses. The first 
hypothesis states that DeMorgan´s law for the negation of conjunctions is 
easier to recognize than the corresponding law for the disjunctions case. 
The second hypothesis states that spontaneous errors in the recognition of 
DeMorgan´s laws follow a cognitive pattern. The results obtained for the 
first hypothesis suggest that the disjunctions case is more intuitive than the 
conjunctions case. An heuristic explanation for such unexpected result is 
suggested. The second hypothesis testing results suggest that the observed 
errors are not random. Suggestions for future research are proposed. | 
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1. Introduction 
The different psychological theories that try to 
explain human reasoning could be classified 
according to the architectural centrality they 
attribute to the formal rules of logic (Braine, 1978; 
Fernández Berrocal & Carretero, 1995; Martín & 
Valiña, 2002). If the model attributes the most 
critical psychological functions to mental or natural 
logic, such theory of reasoning can be described as 
syntactic or rules-driven (Rader & Sloutsky, 2001). 
In the opposite case, when the model rejects the 
centrality of rules and gives priority to 
psychological representations like mental models 
or heuristics, such theory can be considered 
semantic or non-rules-driven. An example of a 
rules-driven reasoning theory is the psychology of 
proof proposed by Rips (1994). On the other side, 
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the most representative non-rules-driven theory of 
deduction is the mental models approach promoted 
by Johnson-Laird (1983; Fumero, Santamaría & 
Johnson-Laird, 2010). Both accounts have 
provided coherent models and profuse evidence 
that explain several patterns of spontaneous 
deductive reasoning when conjunctions, 
disjunctions, negations and other logical functions 
are included in syllogistic tasks (Santamaría, 
1995).  
The present contribution gives a preliminary 
account for a particular case of reasoning that both 
rules-driven and non-rules-driven models have 
only partially studied: the equivalences recognition 
for the negation of conjunctions and for the 
negation of disjunctions (García Madruga, Moreno, 
Carriedo, Gutiérrez & Johnson-Laird, 2001; Rips, 
1994). The aim of this work is to provide an 
exploratory description of the spontaneous 
behavior of human thought when DeMorgan´s laws 
recognition are involved in experimental tasks. 
Although such tasks are properly deductive, the 
present contribution proposes a decision making 
account based on heuristics. This proposal 
preliminary covers the two fundamental criteria 
that organize judgment and decision making 
research, that is, coherence and correspondence 
(Dunwoody, 2009; Hammond, 1996). The former 
is analyzed by the comparison between the 
spontaneous reasoning productions and the 
propositional calculus of DeMorgan´s laws, while 
the latter is explored by proposing a plausible 
algorithm that describes the decision making 
processes involved.  
2. DeMorgan´s laws 
The two fundamental logical properties named 
after Augustus DeMorgan (DeMorgan, 1847; 
Muñoz García, 2005) state that: i) the negation of 
the conjunction of a collection of propositions is 
equivalent to the disjunction formed by the 
negation of each individual proposition and; ii) the 
negation of the disjunction of a collection of 
propositions is equivalent to the conjunction 
formed by the negation of each individual 
proposition. A formal definition of these properties 
is presented in Equations 1 and 2. 
 
( ) ( ) ( )qpqp ¬∨¬⇔∧¬  
(1) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )qpqp ¬∧¬⇔∨¬  
(2) 
The letters p and q are referred to any 
propositions, that is, to declarative statements that 
can be considered either true or false. The 
operations involved in these properties are negation 
( ¬ ), double implication ( ⇔ ), conjunction ( ∧ ) 
and disjunction (∨ ). An application example of 
Equation 1 might be the equivalence between the 
statement “It is false that: Winters are sad and 
summers are happy” and the statement “Winters 
are not sad or summers are not happy”. An 
application example of Equation 2 would be the 
equivalence between “It is false that: Napoleon 
was right-handed or Joan of Arc was left-handed” 
and the statement “Napoleon was not right-handed 
and Joan of Arc was not left-handed”. Both 
examples are taken from the experimental tasks 
introduced below. 
These logical relations can also be formally 
treated as set properties when: i) p and q are 
defined as sets P and Q; ii) the conjunction is 
converted into intersection ( ∩ ) and the disjunction 
into union ( ∪ ), and Equations 1 and 2 are 
translated into Equations 3 and 4, respectively.  
QPQP ∪=∩  
(3) 
QPQP ∩=∪  
(4) 
The upper bar in Equations 3 and 4 expresses 
the set operation of complementation and the 
equality ( = ) implies simultaneous double 
containment ( ⊆  and ⊇ ). A formal proof of 
DeMorgan´s laws as expressed in Equations 3 and 
4 is presented in Equations 5 and 6, where x is any 
arbitrary element. 
)()( QPxQxPxQxPxQPxQPx ∪∈⇔∈∨∈⇔∉∨∉⇔∩∉⇔∩∈  
(5) 
)()( QPxQxPxQxPxQPxQPx ∩∈⇔∈∧∈⇔∉∧∉⇔∪∉⇔∪∈
(6) 
When x is in )( QP ∪  because it is also in 
QP ∩  and vice versa, the equality presented in 
Equation 3 gets proved. The same occurs for 
Equations 6 and 4 when the respective relation is 
followed.  
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3. Previous findings concerning the psychology of 
DeMorgan´s laws 
Although Rips (1994) included these 
properties in PSYCOP, an algorithm that illustrates 
the consistency of his natural logic theory of 
deductive reasoning, only a few experiments have 
been specifically conducted in relation to 
DeMorgan´s laws (Carriedo, Moreno, Gutiérrez & 
García Madruga, 1998; Rader & Sloutsky, 2001). 
The main findings have been collected for the case 
of disjunctive reasoning premises in syllogistic 
tasks. Several studies suggest that content and 
context are critical variables for the propositions 
included in the premises of a syllogism when 
different deductive tasks are presented (Martín & 
Valiña, 2002). It has also been noted that the 
inclusive and exclusive negations of a disjunction 
behave in different psychological manners (Rader 
& Sloutski, 2001). The inclusive interpretation, 
that is, p or q or both, was more frequent in 
abstract and concrete contexts rather than in threat 
or election contexts (Newstead, Griggs & 
Chrostowski, 1984). Richardson and Ormerod 
(1997) found that familiarity and causality in 
conditionals promote the reduction of logical errors 
in syllogistic tasks that include disjunctions. The 
same authors gave other significant suggestions for 
the present study in the context of the experimental 
paradigm of recognition. The tasks of this 
paradigm typically require the selection of the 
correct answer among a list of options. Such 
options are usually syllogism conclusions. Their 
evidence suggests that subjects do not 
spontaneously recognize the equivalence between a 
disjunction and a conditional that includes a 
negation in a premise (Richardson & Ormerod, 
1997).  
In a recent study, Fumero et al. (2010) found 
partial evidence for the hypothesis that predicts 
different reasoning patterns according to different 
personality styles. Extraversion and neuroticism as 
defined in NEO-PI-R personality test (Costa & 
McCrae, 1999) resulted critical for the increment 
of success in modus tollens syllogisms.  
In the tradition of the mental models approach, 
an important collection of findings also suggests 
that the constructive scenarios triggered by 
inclusive and exclusive disjunctions have different 
psychological complexities (Johnson-Laird et al., 
1994). The reason for this difference is the number 
of mental models that each disjunction requires for 
the achievement of a valid syllogistic conclusion. 
The main findings of this research trend indicate 
that (Martín & Valiña, 2002): i) a double exclusive 
disjunction is easier to recognize than an inclusive 
double disjunction; ii) affirmative deductions are 
easier than negative ones and; iii) some ceiling 
effects might be observed in disjunction 
experiments when the tasks are too easy or too 
hard for the experimental subjects (Fumero et al., 
2010).  
From a memory based approach for the study 
of logical connectives, a conjunctive bias has been 
proposed (Rader & Sloutsky, 2001). This bias has 
been defined as the tendency to obtain a more 
accurate performance in recognition and recall for 
conjunctions than for disjunctions and 
implications. To explain such phenomenon the 
authors argued that working memory gets a lower 
load for conjunctions tasks than for other logical 
connectives.  
These previous findings about the psychology 
of DeMorgan´s laws are concerned with 
syllogisms. The present contribution, in contrast, 
proposes the study of the intuitive direct matching 
between the equivalences expressed in Equations 1 
and 2. This task might be considered harder than 
the one usually applied in reasoning experiments, 
but provides a direct evaluation of DeMorgan´s 
laws intuition (Gigerenzer, 2000, 2007).  
In sum, previous findings suggest that 
DeMorgan´s laws equivalences might be harder to 
recognize for the disjunctive case than for the 
conjunctive case. This conjecture might be justified 
because: i) conjunction tasks require a lower 
working memory load than disjunctions; ii) the 
distinction between inclusive and exclusive 
disjunctions might generate diverse interpretations 
that lead to a successful reduction for the 
disjunctive case, as explained below and; iii) the 
conjunctive bias might be activated by 
experimental tasks that imply DeMorgan´s laws.  
The aim of the present contribution focuses on 
the intuitive recognition rather than on the 
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deductive processing of these logical laws. 
Therefore, this exploratory study is original 
because previous findings are exclusively 
concerned with syllogisms.  
4. Method 
An exploratory study was designed to describe 
the spontaneous reasoning behavior of subjects in a 
recognition task that includes DeMorgan´s laws. 
With this purpose a set of reasoning tasks was 
created and administered to a sample of subjects 
drew from the general population. Because the 
present study consists only in a preliminary 
contribution, an on-line experiment was conducted 
to analyse the response patterns and errors for 
Equations 1 and 2, or 3 and 4. A within-subjects 
design was applied to perform such analysis 
according to recent methodological 
recommendations (Lambdin & Shafer, 2009).  
2.1. Participants 
Thirty Argentinean subjects participated in this 
study. Seventeen female and thirteen male (mean 
age 25.82 +/- 2.96 years). All participants were 
randomly recruited from a list of university 
students that visited the website of the Institute for 
Psychological Research at Universidad del 
Salvador (Argentina), located in 
http://iipus.webs.com. Subjects were invited to 
participate in a reasoning experiment when visiting 
the “News” folder of the website. After accepting 
the invitation, subjects completed a ten questions 
test. The original sample had forty subjects, but ten 
did not complete the experiment and therefore 
were excluded from the final sample.  
2.2. Materials and procedure 
In thedesign of the experimental materials, the 
selection paradigm and the inference rules task was 
applied, following the taxonomy proposed by 
Martín and Valiña (2002). This implies that 
subjects received a collection of reasoning tasks. 
Each task consisted in recognizing the logical 
equivalence for a previous given statement among 
a list of options. The sequence of each list was 
randomized. Subjects were informed that only one 
of the four offered alternatives was correct. The 
task consisted in recognizing that equivalence. Ten 
items were included, five for the negation of a 
conjunction (Equations 1 and 3) and five for the 
negation of a disjunction (Equations 2 and 4).  
Because the participants were recruited among 
university students from Argentina, the tasks were 
presented in Spanish. The general instruction stated 
that the experiment consisted in recognizing the 
equivalence between different expressions. With 
that purpose a target statement in capital letters was 
presented. A collection of other four candidate 
statements --in small letters-- was attached to the 
phrase in capital letters. The task was to recognize 
among the small letters statements the equivalent 
to the capital letters statement. A screen capture of 
the on-line task is presented in Figure 1.  
Figure 1  
Screen capture of the on-line recognition task 
 
 
/ote: the general instruction for the experiment was presented in bold fonts. 
Below, in capital letters and also in bold fonts, was presented the target 
statement for the recognition task. Four response options in small letters 
were offered. Subjetcs were instructed to recognize and select the small 
letters equivalent to the capital letters statement.  
 
The response options were designed as 
indicated in Table 1, where the symbol ⇒  
indicates implication, ∨  indicates inclusive 
disjunction, and ∨  indicates exclusive disjunction. 
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Table 1 
Logical figures for the DeMorgan´s laws recognition tasks  
 
DeMorgan´s laws Logical figures for all response options 








∪=∩ BABA  
1. 
a) qp ¬∧¬  
b) qp ¬∨¬ ● 
c) qp ¬⇒¬  
d) qp ¬∨¬  
2. 
a) qp ¬⇒¬  
b) qp ¬∨¬  
c) qp ¬∧¬  
d) qp ¬∨¬ ● 
3. 
a) qp ¬∨¬ ● 
b) qp ¬∧¬  
c) qp ¬∨¬  
d) qp ¬⇒¬  
4. 
a) qp ¬∨¬  
b) qp ¬⇒¬  
c) qp ¬∨¬ ● 
d) qp ¬∧¬  
5. 
a) qp ¬∨¬  
b) qp ¬∧¬  
c) qp ¬∨¬ ● 
d) qp ¬⇒¬  








∩=∪ BABA  
6. 
a) qp ¬⇒¬  
b) qp ¬∨¬   
c) qp ¬∨¬  
d) qp ¬∧¬ ● 
7. 
a) qp ¬∨¬  
b) qp ¬∧¬ ● 
c) qp ¬⇒¬  
d) qp ¬∨¬   
8. 
a) qp ¬∨¬  
b) qp ¬⇒¬  
c) qp ¬∧¬ ● 
d) qp ¬∨¬  
9. 
a) qp ¬∧¬ ● 
b) qp ¬∨¬  
c) qp ¬∨¬  
d) qp ¬⇒¬  
10. 
a) qp ¬⇒¬  
b) qp ¬∧¬ ● 
c) qp ¬∨¬  
d) qp ¬∨¬  
/ote: the tasks 1 to 5 correspond to the Equations 1 and 3. The tasks 6 to 10 correspond to the Equations 2 and 4. The symbol ● indicates the correct 
equivalence.  
 
The materials included in these tasks involve 
the participation of inclusive and exclusive 
disjunctions because previous studies suggested the 
importance of such distinction (Martín & Valiña, 
2002). Care was also taken to exclude statements 
semantically related to extraversion and 
neuroticism to avoid performance differences 
induced by personality variables according to the 
recent contributions by Fumero et al. (2010).  
2.3. Hypotheses 
The experimental hypothesis H1 states that the 
logical equivalence for the negation of a 
conjunction (NC) is easier to recognize than the 
equivalence for the negation of a disjunction (ND). 
Formally, %D%CH >:1 . Both variables ND and 
NC are operationalized as the mean of correct 
recognitions for the corresponding cases. This 
hypothesis is formulated in coherence with 
previous findings that provide evidence for the 
harder condition of disjunctions processing when 
compared to conjunctions (García Madruga, 
Gutiérrez, Carriedo, Moreno & Johnson-Laird, 
2002; Martín & Valiña, 2002). The core argument 
that holds for this hypothesis states that 
conjunction has only one truth table, but 
disjunction has two. The inclusive disjunction 
(expressed as ∨ ) is formally different than the 
exclusive disjunction (expressed as ∨ ).  
 
The experimental hypothesis H2 states that 
spontaneous errors in the recognition of 
DeMorgan´s laws follow a specific pattern. 
Because three different incorrect answers were 
offered in the equivalence tasks as indicated in 
Table 1, the hypothesis H2a states that at least one 
comparison between the frequency of incorrect 
answers for the NC case shows a significant 
difference. Such difference would imply the 
dominance of one particular error figure (E). 
Formally, 
{ }3,2,1,/,:2 ==≠∀∀≠ jijijiE%CE%CaH ji . 
The hypothesis H2b states the same that was 
expressed in H2a, but for errors in the ND case. 
Formally,  
{ }3,2,1,/,:2 ==≠∀∀≠ jijijiE%DE%DbH ji . 
This exploratory conjecture emerges from the 
heuristics and biases approach (Kahneman & 
Klein, 2009; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 2000). It is proposed that 
thought errors are not systematically random and 
that a coherent descriptive model for such 
phenomena can eventually be proposed (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). A recent example of a heuristic 
account for similar error patterns in logical 
reasoning tasks has been provided by Macbeth, 
López Alonso, Razumiejczyk, Sosa, Pereyra, and 
Fernández (2009).  
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5.  Results and discussion 
The H1 hypothesis was not supported. As 
predicted, a different response pattern between NC 
and ND was found, but not in the expected 
direction. The opposite pattern was observed (sign 
test, p < .001, Cliff´s δ effect size = 0.52). The 
number of recognitions was significantly greater 
for the negation of disjunctions 
( 103.2,3.2 == SD%D ) than for the negation of 
conjunctions ( 03.1,37.0 == SD%C ). A possible 
interpretation for this unexpected result is related 
with the heuristics and biases approach to thought 
phenomena. Instead of a formal deductive 
reasoning computation, a decision making process 
has probably been triggered by the proposed 
experimental task. Subjects might have taken 
shortcuts to select a response option as suggested 
by Gigerenzer for similar reasoning tasks 
(Gigerenzer, 2000, 2007). If that is the case, then a 
possible heuristic could be the sequential 
representation of simultaneous possible scenarios. 
An intuitive criterion based on the hints proposed 
by Johnson-Laird (1983) to explain the structure of 
these processes might be the quantity of scenarios 
involved in the representation, that is, the 
cardinality of the scenarios set. This heuristic 
sequence might have two rules: i) always try to 
reduce the scenarios set cardinality and; ii) increase 
the scenarios set cardinality only when that is 
inevitable. This search for the better response 
option ends when the final scenario of the target 
proposition matches one of the offered options. 
The application of this heuristic leads to the 
observed results. For example, let qp ∧  be a 
scenario with two objects: a plate ( p ) and a spoon 
( q ) are over a table. The scenarios sequence may 
always start with affirmative conditions because 
some experiments suggest that the human mind 
tends to be candid or spinozian (Gilbert, Malone, & 
Krull, 1990; Spinoza, 1998/1677), that is, the 
information processing starts accepting the original 
true condition of all statements. Negation or 
falseness attribution is posterior, that is, a second 
instance operation (Skurnik, 1998). Under this 
condition, the starting scenario might be, for 
example, the representation of a plate and a spoon 
over a table. The affirmative or true condition of p 
is represented by the presence of the plate over the 
table. Hence, the negation or falseness of p has to 
be the absence of the plate. After the starting 
scenario of qp ∧  is given, the negation occurs to 
build up the target proposition of the experimental 
task. If this process follows the proposed heuristic, 
then rules i and ii must be applied. The first one 
fails because the negation of the disjunction cannot 
preserve the cardinality of 1 and a cardinality of 2 
must be accepted by rule ii. The result is a scenario 
with two possible tables, one with no plate, and the 
other with no spoon. After completing this process, 
the search for the answer ends with a cardinality of 
2.  
For the disjunction negation the opposite 
occurs. The original scenario has a cardinality of 2 
because two possible tables are needed, one with a 
plate (no spoon) and the other with a spoon (no 
plate). The negation gives a new scenario that is 
compatible with rule i, that is, a cardinality 
reduction can be achieved. The result is a scenario 
with an empty table after building up the target 
proposition. The condition of no plate and no 
spoon matches faster and easier a response option 
in this experiment. Table 2 summarizes the 
proposed heuristic using the notation of the mental 
models approach (Fumero et al., 2010; Johnson-
Laird, 1983).  
Table 2 
A possible heuristic that accounts for the easier recognition of 
disjunction negations when compared to conjunction 
negations 
 
Conjunction negation Disjunction negation 
 
1. Affirmative or candid statement 
(#1) 
p q 
 
 
2. Negation (#2) 
-p 
-q 
 
 
1. Affirmative or candid statement 
(#2) 
p 
q 
 
2. Negation (#1) 
-p -q 
 
/ote: the cardinality (#) increases for the negation and decreases for the 
disjunction after heuristic rules i and ii are applied. A smaller cardinality 
possibly implies that the task is easier.  
 
Additionally, it is pertinent to comment on the 
argument presented to support the hypothesis H1 
related to the double truth table of the logical 
disjunction. Although the argument is relevant, 
DeMorgan´s laws apply only to the inclusive 
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condition. The non equivalence of the exclusive 
disjunction expressed in Equations 2 and 4 might 
be observed in Tables 3 and 4.  
Table 3 
Truth table for the inclusive disjunction 
 
¬  (p  ∨  )q  ⇔  ¬  p  ∧  ¬  q  
F T T T T F T F F T 
F T T F T F T F T F 
F F T T T T F F F T 
T F F F T T F T T F 
/ote: because the double implication is always true, the relation is an 
equivalence or tautology.  
 
Table 4 
Truth table for the exclusive disjunction 
 
¬ (p  ∨  )q  ⇔  ¬  p  ∧  ¬  q  
T T F T F F T F F T 
F T T F T F T F T F 
F F T T T T F F F T 
T F F F T T F T T F 
/ote: because the double implication is not always true, the relation is not an 
equivalence. The discrepancy can be appreciated in the first sentence, where 
the simultaneous truth of p and q generates a false exclusive disjunction. The 
corresponding sentence for the inclusive case generates a true disjunction in 
Table 3.  
 
This restriction implies that the negation of 
conjunctions and the negation of disjunctions have 
both only one truth table for DeMorgan´s laws. 
Hence, the disjunctions case cannot be expected to 
be harder than the conjunctions case. The 
experimental results of the present study are 
consistent with this observation.  
The hypothesis H2 resulted partially coherent 
with the evidence. An error pattern was found for 
the negation of conjunctions expected in H2a. Only 
a random behavior of errors was found for the 
negation of disjunctions stated in H2b. The most 
frequent response error for the negation of 
conjunctions case had the form ( )qp ¬∧¬ . The 
selection of this response was significantly more 
frequent than the selection of the alternative 
options indicated in Table 5.  
A significant difference between errors 1 and 2 
(sign test, p = .043, Cliff´s δ effect size = 1) and 
between errors 1 and 3 (sign test, p = .043, Cliff´s δ 
effect size = 1) was found. No significant 
difference resulted between errors 2 and 3 (sign 
test, p = .414, Cliff´s δ effect size = 0.08).  
 
 
 
Table 5 
Response errors frequency patterns for DeMorgan´s laws 
 
Logic figure Mean (SD) 
 
Negation of conjuntions 
1. ( )qp ¬∧¬  21(4.24) 
2. ( )qp ¬⇒¬  2.6(1.52) 
3. ( )qp ¬∨¬  4.6(3.65) 
 
Negation of disjunctions 
1. ( )qp ¬∨¬  6.2(2.86) 
2. ( )qp ¬⇒¬  4.6(36) 
3. ( )qp ¬∨¬  6.8(4.76) 
 
 
No significant difference was found between 
the errors for the disjunctions case (sign tests, ps > 
.05, Cliff´s δ effect sizes < 0.20), against the 
expectations of H2b. This result suggests that 
errors in the recognition of the equivalence for the 
negation of disjunctions behave in a random 
manner.  
In sum, the results on the first hypothesis 
suggest that subjects achieve a better recognition 
for the disjunctions law than for the conjunctions 
law. In regards with the second hypothesis, the 
results suggest that the observed errors for the 
conjunctions law follow a pattern, but errors for the 
disjunctions law do not. This evidence is consistent 
with a mental models approach that explains why 
the negation of disjunctions generates a reduction 
of the working memory load. In contrast, the 
negation of conjunctions implies an amplification 
of the mental information amount, which leads to 
difficulties in the recognition of its logical 
equivalence.  
6. General Discussion 
The results obtained in the present study 
suggest that: i) the spontaneous recognition of the 
logical equivalence for the negation of disjunctions 
is more intuitive than the corresponding to the 
conjunctions case and; ii) the errors in the 
recognition of DeMorgan´s laws follow a pattern, 
but only for the negation of conjunctions.  
Although the negation of disjunctions might be 
considered harder to process than the negation of 
conjunctions because the former has a more 
complex logical form than the latter (García 
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Madruga et al., 2001), the results of the present 
contribution showed the opposite phenomenon for 
DeMorgan´s laws. An heuristic account was 
proposed to explain this unexpected result. 
Subjects probably followed a decision process 
rather than a deductive computation. It was 
suggested that experimental participants 
spontaneously tried to reduce the magnitude of the 
task representations and that this shortcut provides 
an easier way to find the correct equivalent for a 
given statement that satisfies the form of 
DeMorgan´s laws.  
The main difference with previous findings is 
probably related with the expected activation of the 
conjunctive bias (Rader & Sloutsky, 2001). This 
phenomenon did not occur in the present study. 
This result can be justified because that bias has 
been studied for syllogistic tasks, but not for 
intuitive or non-effort recognition processing. The 
recent ecological approach to thought phenomena 
suggests that spontaneous human cognition 
typically activates heuristics rather than complex 
inferential computations to complete cognitive 
tasks (Gigerenzer, 2007). In that context, a decision 
making account concerned with a mental models 
reduction explains why an heuristic, rather than the 
conjunctive bias, was activated.  
The present contribution is only exploratory 
and has several limitations: i) data were collected 
on-line; ii) although the statistical power of the 
tested hypotheses was set at .80, the sample of 
participants was small; iii) the response options 
offered in the task were limited and were not 
obtained from a representative sample of tasks 
(Dhami, Hertwig, & Hoffrage, 2004), and iv) the 
heuristic proposed to give an account for the 
exploratory results might be plausible, but no 
further experimental evidence was obtained to 
support it. These limitations should be reduced in 
further studies. The main findings obtained in the 
present contribution might be thoroughly tested in 
future experiments.  
The results of the present study are preliminary 
contributions to the two main approaches to the 
psychology of thought for the intuition of 
DeMorgan´s laws, that is, the coherence and the 
correspondence criteria (Dunwoody, 2009; 
Hammond, 1996). The results obtained after 
hypothesis H1 were discussed in the context of the 
normative propositional calculus as a contribution 
to the coherence approach. The account suggested 
for explaining the errors indicated in hypothesis H2 
contribute, in contrast, to the correspondence 
criteria because it priorizes the empirical accuracy 
over the normative consistency.  
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